This paper analyzes whether the three-point rule in soccer brought more action to the game for a large sample of European championships in 1990-1997, revealing team-specic heterogeneity of responses caused by dierences in team tactics in the period prior to the rule change. Teams that relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics dramatically changed their behavior towards more attacking style in away games, considerably reducing probability of a tie. Interestingly, even though the three-point rule signicantly reduced proportion of ties, it did not bring more goals into the game because the increased rewards of scoring when the current score is tied were oset by increased incentives of defending the current score when one team led.
"They tried this in British soccer and everything I've heard is that it didn't make a dierence."
In the middle of the 90's, The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the world soccer government body, recommended all national soccer federations to reward three points for a win in national tournament games instead 1 of two points under the old rule. Public statements by FIFA ocials indicated that...they were increasing the rewards for wins while hoping for more scoring [Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005] . The push for more scoring aimed at counteracting the long term trend of declining in goals per game that has started after the 1954 World Cup when 5.4 goals per game was scored and hit the rock bottom in the 1990 World Cup in Italy with only 2.2 goals per game 1 , making the game less exciting for fans.
Did the three-point system in soccer make a dierence? Was it a terrible idea, as Brian Burke said? The questions have been investigated for Portugal [Guedes and Machado, 2002] , Spain [Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005] , and Germany [Dilger and Geyer, 2009] , with the general conclusion that the threepoint rule has brought two osetting incentives. On the one hand, when the game is tied, the three-point rule encourages more oensive tactics for both teams. On the other hand, when a team leads, it has incentives to play more defensively than under the old regulations. On aggregate, the three-point rule has very small impact on the number of goals per game. This paper investigates the impact of the change in the rule of assigning points on game outcomes and the tournament strategies, looking at a larger dataset of games in eight European countries 2 from 1990 to 1997. It argues that there is no common response of heterogeneous teams to the change in the rule. The eect of the three-point rule considerably varies from one country to another, depending on the proportion of games that ended up as ties in the period prior to introduction of the new rule. Therefore, it is dicult to generalize the impact of the three-point rule, by looking at evidence from just one country. Moreover, it turns out that Portugal, Spain, and Germany were among European championships the least aected by the change.
Moschini [2010] , is the only paper the author is aware of that looked at data for 35 countries and found a statistically signicant increase in the number of goals and decrease in the percentage of ties caused by the rule change. However, the paper looked at the aggregate data and could not reveal important heterogeneity of responses across teams. The identication strategy in this paper utilizes the cross-country variation in timing of introducing the three-point system, as well as, cross-team variation in the intensity of ties for the period before the change had been introduced. The usage of team-pair xed eects allows looking at the within team-pair specic eects caused by the rule change, the strategy that is not possible for the aggregate data. The main nding is highly heterogeneous reaction to the new rule in dierent countries and for dierent teams, linked to the initial proportion of ties in the national soccer competitions and reliance of teams on tie-intensive tactics prior to the change.
1 In European club competitions, there was a similar trend. Internazionale Milan that dominated European and national competitions in 60's applied catenaccio an extremely defensive tactics that helped them winning two European and three national titles. The defensive security is the primary objective of catenaccio. A team that utilizes this strategy would try hard to score in the beginning of the game and then, with a lead of 1-0, would implement catenaccio.
2 Countires are Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain.
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The investigated question is closely related to the literature on heterogeneous responses of economic agents to the changes in policies [Heckman, 2001] , sometimes leading to consequences unintended by policymakers. In Melitz [2003] , trade liberalization leads to expansion of more productive rms but causes least productive rms to close down. Rajan and Zingales [1998] showed that nancial development is the most inductive for growth of more nancially dependent industries. In this paper, a similar identication strategy is applied. Since the three-point rule had made a tie less attractive outcome, teams that used more tie-intensive tactics had stronger incentives to switch to more aggressive tactics.
After the change in the rule, the game where the away team is in the fourth quartile according to tie-intensities are 11 percent more likely to end up as the home win and 15 percent less likely to end up as the tie.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives literature review. Section 3 presents some stylized facts and describe data. Section 4 develops a model and discusses the identication strategy. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes.
Background
The philosophy of soccer emphasizes the maintenance of balance between oense and defense. The fact that teams score approximately 2.6 goals combined per game makes each goal very valuable and discourages teams from placing too many resources into oensive eorts. At the same time, there has been the overall trend of declining average number of goals per game throughout most of the 20th century from above 4 goals per game to current 2.6 goals per game. A closely related problem was high proportion of ties, especially 0-0 and 1-1 ties, in national tournaments that became more pronounced in the 1970's.
Some National Soccer Federations were even forced to introduced measures, specically targeting the ties . For instance, in the USSR, the cap on the maximum number of draws per season had been in place from 1978 till 1988; a point for a tie has not been awarderd for teams that exceeded the limit which was initially set as 8 ties per season and later softened to 10 ties per season. The cap had been introduced after the 1977 season when proportion of ties reached 44 percent amidst the accusations of game xing that involved trading of ties between teams in home and away games.
In the beginning of the 1990's, promoting more aggressive soccer and ob- , 1930-2006 serving the experience of the English Premiership league that introduced the three-point rule in the 1980's, the European soccer body UEFA recommended awarding three points for a win instead of two points as under the old rule.
By 1996, the new system was universally adopted in all countries under the guidance of the international soccer organization, FIFA. While there is some evidence that this change reduced proportion of ties, the eect has had a minimal impact on scoring. To explain the puzzle, Brocas and Carrillo [2004] set up a dynamic game model to study the implications of the three-point rule on the ow of soccer games. They showed that when a team is in the lead the incentive for the team to play oensively may be lower under the three-point rule than under the two-point rule because of the higher expected loss of losing the lead in the game under the new rule.
The empirical estimation of the impact of the three-point rule on games outcomes got attention in the literature [Dilger and Geyer, 2009 , Guedes and Machado, 2002 , Moschini, 2010 , Palacios-Huerta, 2004 ]. An empirical challenge that researchers are facing is the problem of establishing a causal relationship that goes from changing the rule to changing outcomes of the game. However, the main drawback of the paper is the analysis of aggregated nal standings rather than microdata of actual games.
Model
Suppose that a home team i plays against an away team j. a i and a j characterize oensive abilities of the teams, while d i and d j characterize their defensive abilities. The scoring potential of team i in a game against team j dened as unrecognizable from the one that will be used for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa in June and July. Leather has given way to synthetics. Some 32 individually sewn panels have become eight. Hand stitching has given way to thermal bonding. The result is a faster-than-ever ball for a faster-than-ever game that allows players to attempt laser-like strikes from 40 yards, and precise long-distance passes that would have been impossible with a ball from the 1960s or 1970s. Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2010 4 soccer clubs reoptimized and changed their behavior in response to stronger incentives, but that they did this largely in a manner undesired by the principal: they engaged in more sabotage activities and managed to decrease the output desired by the principal. [Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005] 5 the number of goals scored by the home team, G ij , is
where h > 0 represents the home eld advantage 5 . Function g(a, d) transforms the abilities of the teams into expected number of goals scored by the attacking team, having the following properties g 1 > 0, g 11 < 0, g 2 < 0, and g 11 < 0. The error term µ ij = H t + H ij + ij consists of the time eect H t , pair-specic eect H ij , and the random term ij ∼ (0, σ 2 ) is an independent identically distributed shock that includes the impact of such unobservable factors as luck, weather conditions, referee qualication etc.
Analogously, the number of goals scored by the away team, Q ij , is
The error term ν ij = A t +A ij +ϕ ij consists of the time eect A t , pair-specic eect A ij , and the random term ν ij ∼ (0, σ 2 ν ) is an independent identically distributed shock.
Suppose further that the function g takes log-linear form g = αln(a)+βln(d).
The probability of win for the home team is
where F is logistic cdf, D t = H t − A t , and D ij = H ij − A ij . Similarly, I dene equations for ties and losses as
To introduce strategic considerations of teams and test whether they are important parts of team's motivation, we add a strategy related variable R ct that takes value of 1 if the soccer tournament in county c at time t is played under the three-point rule, and takes value of 0 otherwise. The probability of a certain outcome, O = W in, T ie, Loss, is modied as follows
To evaluate the impact of the three-point rule on scoring of home and away teams, I estimate the poisson regressions of the following form
The median value of the home eld advantage in the sample is 1, while the average value is 0.62 6 and
where GF ijt and GA ijt are goals scored for and against in the game between teams i and j in the season t.
Finally, to look if the three-point rule has a heterogeneous eect on dierent teams, I estimate the following model
where tie i and tie j are average proportions of ties of home and away teams in the period before the three-point rule has been introduced and O = W in, T ie, Loss.
As an illustration, a negative signs of γ 1 and γ 2 for the probability of a tie would indicate that teams pursuing a strategy of drawing a tie more extensively before the new rule has been introduced, has switched to a more aggresive tactics.
As the main objective, the two following hypotheses are tested. Unconditionally, the new rule discourages ties because it is not optimal to tie in the tournament settings when the team's objective is to win the tournament. However, over the course of the game, the new rule encourages attacking mode only when the current score is tied. When one team leads, the new rule discourages attacking mode for the leading team relative to the two-points per win, while it has only an indirect eect on the incentives for the team that trails behind, stemming from the strategic considerations over the course of a season. As a result, the overall eect on the number of goals scored is not clear.
However, the three-point rule does reduce probability of a 0-0 score towards 1-0 and 0-1 outcomes, and reduce probability of a 1-1 score towards 1-2 and 2-1 scores. Also, the three-point rule impact is stronger for teams that were more intensively using defensive tactics trying to draw a tie in the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. 
4.2
What scores are more popular and how does it change after introducing the three-point system?
Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of game outcomes before the threepoint was introduced calculated as a percentage of the total number of games. 12.15% as a 1-0 home win, and 11.28% as a 0-0 draw.
After the introduction of the new rule the rankings of the most popular outcomes has been slightly changed as the panel B of Table 2 demonstrates.
It displays the same statistics after the new rule has been introduced for the same group of countries. Under the new rule, 12.15% of games ended up as a 1-1 draw, 11.72% as a 1-0 home win, and 9.45% as a 2-0 home win, while a 0-0 draw took the fourth place with 8.65% of all games. The panel C of Table 2 displays the dierences between panels A and B. The three-point rule led to reduction in such popular draw outcomes as 0-0, and 1-1 by a total of 4.04%. The adjustment mostly came through the increase in the percentage of away wins 0-1, and 1-2 by a total of 1.53%. The inspection of the marginal distributions gives as additional insights: an outcome when one of the teams scores three or more goals became more frequent and the eect is more pronounced for away teams.
Initially, I conclude that the introduction of the new rule had the most impact on incentives to score for away teams. When the game starts at 0-0, both teams have more incentives to score under the new rule, because the benets of scoring are higher two extra points to the team's total number of points in the season rather than one extra point under the old rule. However, once a team takes a lead, it has more incentive to play defensively under the new rule, because 8 Higher competitive balance measured as more equal distribution of total points across teams in the tournament would be benecial for soccer because it makes the oucome of the game more uncertain and more fun to watch, leading to more spectators and as a result to higher revenues from gate receipts and TV commercials. 
Results
For each observation, I observe information on the number of goals scored, S ijt , and conceded, C ijt , by the home team. I also observe information on the nal standings of each team represented by its rank in the end of the season and total number of goals scored, T S iT , and conceded, T C iT , by the team.
To measure oensive and defensive abilities of teams i and j, I construct following measures of oensive and defensive abilities
where T G iT and T G iT are the total number of games played by teams i and j in season T . I eliminate the impact of the current game to avoid the problem of endogeneity of the explanatory variables due to the fact that the current result directly enters into calculations of the totals. Table 3 reports estimation of equations 4, 5, and 6 for the following outcomes wins, ties, losses, goals scored for and against the home team. Results suggest no signicant impact of the new rule on all dependent variables, except the probability of drawing a tie which has reduced by 6 percent after the new rule has been introduced. The relative attack and defense variables are signicant and have expected signs.
Introducing interaction of the team-specic proportion of ties for the period before the three-point rule has been introduced with the three-point rule indicator variable reveals that the change in the rule had more pronounced eect for teams that had higher proportion of tied games. Table 4 reports the regression estimates of the eect of the three point rule as well as on the eect of the interaction terms on wins, ties, losses, goals for, and goals against controlling for relative attacking and defensive skills, time eects, and team-pair eects.
More tie-intensive teams, i.e. Genoa, Roma, and Torino from Italy and Lille and Martiques from France, are less likely to draw a tie after the three-point rule has been introduced regardless of whether they play at home or away. Interestingly, more tie-intensive teams are more likely to lose the game on the road after the three-point rule has been introduced because more attacking tactics is not their natural mode of play. Therefore, the more aggressive tactics selected by tie-intensive away teams makes them more vulnerable to failure.
An approach, alternative to including the interaction terms, is to split the sample according to the tie-intensity of teams and run the same regressions Table reports Table 4 the away teams are actually more sensitive to the change in the rule. Table 5 shows that after the change in the rule the game where away team is in the fourth quartile according to tie-intensities are 11 percent more likely to end up as the home win and 15 percent less likely to end up as the tie. Again, this result reiterates the previous conclusion that teams that were engaged in tie-intensive strategies under the two point rule were forced to switch to more aggressive game. In addition, they became more vulnerable and suered higher proportion of defeats.
Finally, proportion of ties before the three point rule has been introduced signicantly diered across countries. France, Poland and Italy had the highest proportion of ties of 0.33 and above, while Romania had the lowest proportion of 0.21. Table 6 reports estimates of the impact of the change in the rule on games outcomes for each country in the sample. As expected, the rule change had signicant negative impact on the probability of tie in Poland (by -17 percent), France (by -16 percent), and Italy (by -10 percent). Quite unexpectedly, the probability of tie has decline by 10 percent in the Netherlands as well. In all other countries the eect is insignicant. Another important result is a considerable increase in the probability of loss by the home team in France and Romania (by 21 percent), Italy (18 percent), and Spain (by 11 percent). The increase in the probability of loss in those countries came from more aggressive estimates of the eect of changing the point rule on games outcome -probability of win, tie, and loss, as well as goals scored for and against the home team interacting with team specic proportions of ties for the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. All models include time-and team-pair xed eects. Relative attack and defence variables control for the dierence in oensive and defensive abilities of teams during the current season. Table reports logit regression estimates of the eect of changing the point rule on games outcomes probability of win, tie, and loss estimated separately for four equal groups of games. Observations are split into four quartiles according to the average proportion of the tied games for the away team in the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. Each element in the table is estimated by a separate logit regression and reports the change in the probability of the outcome due to the change in the point rule. All models include time-and team-pair xed eects. Relative attack and defence variables control for the dierence in oensive and defensive abilities of teams during the current season are included but not reported.
16 away strategy resulted in higher number of goals scored by the away teams. At the same time, no signicant increase in the number of goals scored by the home teams is found in any country in the sample.
6 Did the three point system inuence nal scores? Table 7 reports the impact of the three-point rule on probability of the nal score, which is reported at the top of the table. The eect is estimated on the whole sample, as well as on four sub-samples, selected according to the quartiles of distribution of proportion of ties for an away team computed for the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. Overall, a 10 percent lower probability of a 0-0 ourcome is statistically dierent from zero at 5 percent condence level. However, looking at estimates for four sub-samples gives a dierent conclusion, the only statistically signicant change after the new rule has been introduced occurred for the fourth quartile probability of a 1-1 outcome declined by 19 percent while probability of a 0-1 outcome increased by 24
percent. There were no statistically signicant shift in the probability of score outcomes for any other sub-sample.
The signicant shift in the distribution of nal scores from 1-1 to 0-1 can explain why incentives for more attacking tactics that are present when the game begins do not lead to more scoring per game. Under the three-point rule, the away team that scored rst, has stronger incentives to defend 0-1 outcome, because it protects two points under the three-point rule relative to only one point under the two-point rule. The change in incentives lead to statistically signicant drop in 1-1 outcome and increase in 0-1 outcome.
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that lack of an aggregate response to a change in a policy can disguise signicant heterogeneity of responses along some dimensions that characterize economic agents, rms, or soccer clubs. The same policy can have counter-balancing eects on two groups of agents with responses that cancel out each other after aggregation. During a soccer game, the three-point rule increases incentives to attack while the game is tied, and increases incentives to protect the current score when the team leads. On average, there is a negligible eect of the three-point rule on number of goals per game. At the same time, the two-point rule skewed incentives of away teams in favor of defending the tie, generating high frequency of outcomes 0-0 and 1-1. The three-point rule has destroyed those incentives and encouraged away teams to play more aggressively.
In particular, the three-point rule in soccer had a large impact on behavior of teams that, prior to the new rule, relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics in away games. The change in behavior of this group led to lower proportion of ties, more goals scored by away teams, and signicant shift from 1-1 outcome to 0-1 outcome. Likewise, the national soccer competitions that had higher Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses (a) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 Notes: Table reports proportion of ties before the three-point rule has been introduced, responded more strongly to the rule change. Interestingly, shifting the away tactics to more aggressive mode increases both the probability of winning and probability of loosing the game.
Heterogeneity of responses is measured on within team-pair variation in teams' behavior, and accounting for time trend, which allows controlling for technological progress, development of better managerial practices, and other factors that can lead to structural changes in game outcomes. In addition, dierent timing of the rule change in the countries represented in the sample, allows separate the time trend from the eect of the policy change.
